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Abstract
This paper studies how voters’ demand for reform affects the probability that eco-
nomic reforms are adopted and, conditional on being adopted, their quality. We con-
sider a model of electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters in which the
success of policy changes is tied to a politician’s unobservable competence. We show
that when the demand for reform is high, the electoral process becomes over-responsive:
Candidates promise reforms despite their inability to carry-out welfare-improving pol-
icy changes. As voters must then choose between potentially harmful reforms or no
reform, high demand for reform tends to be associated with lower probability of reform
and/or lower quality of reform. We explain how our results help organize the mixed
evidence regarding the impact of crises on the likelihood of reform.
JEL Classification: D72, D78, D83.
Keywords: Crises, Reforms, Rationally Ignorant Voters, Campaigns.
∗We thank Avidit Acharya, Scott Ashworth, Laurent Bouton, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Peter Buis-
seret, Micael Castanheira, Allan Drazen, Justin Fox, Navin Kartik, Pablo Montagnes, Roger Myerson, Larry
Samuelson, Francesco Squintani, Dustin Tingley, Gabriel Ulyssea, Richard Van Weelden, seminar partici-
pants at APSA, MPSA, Princeton, University of Chicago, Harris School, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Mannheim,
University of Oslo, ECARES, SITE, and EITM Institute for helpful comments, as well as Kate Anthony
and Richard Jung for excellent research assistance. We are especially grateful to B˚ard Harstad, for very
valuable feedback. All remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. A previous version of the manuscript
was circulated under the title: “Information and Reforms: Electoral Campaigns and the Voters’ Curses.”
Authors’ emails: cp747@georgetown.edu and s.wolton@lse.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
Under what conditions are economic reforms likely to pass and succeed? Confronted with
a stark divergence between widely accepted academic prescriptions and policy practice (e.s.,
Drazen, 2000, p.403), copious studies have investigated how the existence of political con-
straints impedes the adoption of welfare-improving reforms. Previous scholarship has stressed
the role of policy-makers’ electoral concerns (e.g., Fu and Li, 2014), the difficulty of recruiting
competent policy-makers into public service (e.g., Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007), and conflicts
over the allocation of costs and benefits (e.g., Alesina and Drazen, 1991).1
While addressing important aspects of the problem, previous theoretical works generally
fall short on two points. First, the role of voters is not well understood: Voters are not
passive recipient of politicians’ decisions and their support for reformist agenda, necessary
for their adoption in democratic systems, is not always guaranteed (Stokes, 1996). Second,
the relationship between economic conditions and the strength of political obstacles to reform
remains somewhat elusive: The conventional scholarly wisdom that economic crises trigger
reform has been called into question by several empirical studies (e.g., Drazen and Easterly,
2001; Pop-Eleches, 2009).
In this paper, we show how poor economic conditions can trigger voters’ skepticism to-
wards candidates promoting changes and lead to a decrease the probability of reforms and/or
an increase in the likelihood of botched reforms. In bad economic times, the electoral pro-
cess becomes over-responsive: Candidates propose a reformist agenda despite not having the
competence to carry out welfare-improving policy changes. The electoral appeal of reformist
candidates then decreases, and so can the overall probability of reform. While we are not the
first to stress the role of voters in the implementation of reforms,2 our theory highlights the
importance of considering the strategic interactions between politicians and voters. Voters’
opinion of reforms and candidates’ willingness to propose policy change cannot be understood
separately.
We study a model with a representative voter (to whom we reserve the pronoun ‘she’) and
two candidates competing for office. Candidates privately observe their level of competence
and choose a platform: a status quo policy or a reform policy, which is politically costly to
1For an excellent review of the early literature on this issue, see Drazen (2000, Chap. 10 and 13).
2See, for example, the seminal contribution of Fernandez and Rodrick (1991) in the case of individual
uncertainty about the consequences of reform.
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implement. Competence has three properties in our setting. First, the cost of implementing
the reform policy is lower for a competent politician than an incompetent one. Second,
the reform policy benefits the voter only if carried out by a competent politician. Third,
competence cannot be directly revealed to the voters; only policy platforms can be credibly
communicated.
The voter, however, is cognitively constrained: in order to learn candidates’ platforms, she
needs to pay costly attention to the electoral campaign. Electoral communication, moreover,
requires “effort” (e.g., campaign spending) by candidates. Greater communication effort
and/or attention increases the probability that the voter learns a candidate’s platform.
Voter’s rational ignorance plays a key role in our theory. As the reform policy is costly to
implement, candidates need to be electorally rewarded for their reformist commitment, which
can occur only if the voter pays sufficient attention to the campaign. For the voter, the value
of learning a candidate’s platform depends on her expected payoff from selecting a reformist
candidate. A novel implication of our approach is that voter’s incentive to pay attention to
the campaign is endogenous to politicians’ equilibrium behaviors and to the voter’s demand
for reform, which we define as the difference in voter’s payoffs between a successful reform
policy and the status quo policy.
When the screening problem faced by the voter is severe enough (i.e., competent and
incompetent politicians’ cost of implementing the reform policy are relatively close), the
electoral process performs best (i.e., the voter’s welfare is maximized) when candidates play
a separating strategy profile: commit to the reform policy only if competent.3 In a separating
assessment, the probability of reform is positive, whereas the probability of a botched reform
is zero. We show that, even though commitment to reform entails a cost (it is not cheap
talk) and this cost is lower for competent candidates (the single-crossing condition holds), a
separating equilibrium does not exist when the demand for reform is high.
To understand this result, suppose that in time of high demand, only competent candi-
dates were to propose the reform policy. The voter would pay great attention to the campaign:
The gain from successful reform is high and platforms are a perfect signal of competence,
so learning a candidate’s reformist commitment is very valuable. As a result, the electoral
reward for committing to the reform policy would be large. While this would encourage a
3As multiple equilibria can arise in our model, we select the equilibrium which maximizes the voter’s
welfare. As such, we focus on the best case scenario for the voter.
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competent candidate to commit to the reform policy, it would also discourage an incom-
petent candidate from proposing the status quo policy. Despite his higher implementation
cost, an incompetent candidate would then prefer to deviate and propose the reform policy.
When demand for reform is high, the voter would pay too much attention for a separating
equilibrium to exist.
The reasoning above implies that when reforms are most needed, electoral competition
no longer protects the voter from harmful policy change. In any equilibrium with a positive
probability of reform, the voter also faces the risk of botched reforms. Due to this risk, high
demand for reform does not necessarily increase the likelihood of reform. The correlation
between these two variables depends critically on the payoff loss resulting from a reform
carried out by an incompetent politician, which we refer to as the voter’s selection concern.
When the selection concern is high, the welfare-maximizing equilibrium is unresponsive:
neither candidate proposes the reform policy. When the voter’s selection concern is intermedi-
ary, under certain conditions on the implementation cost, the welfare-maximizing equilibrium
features one candidate promising the reform policy independently of his type, whereas his
opponent always promises the status quo policy. In this asymmetric equilibrium, learning
the reformist candidate’s platform is only an imperfect signal of competence. Compared to
the separating equilibrium, the voter is more skeptical about the value of electoral communi-
cation and pays less attention to the campaign. This, in turn, results in a low probability of
electing the reformist candidate. High demand for reform is then associated with a relatively
low probability of reform and a relatively high probability of botched reform. Consequently,
a high demand for reform translates into a relatively high probability of (successful and
botched) reforms only when the voter’s selection concern is low.
Our results have important implications for understanding how crises—defined as a period
of high demand for reform—affect the adoption of economic reforms. While the conventional
wisdom holds that crises trigger reforms (Tommasi and Velasco, 1996), empirical evidence
on the issue have been mixed. A few papers confirm the conventional wisdom (e.g., Alesina
et al., 2006; Prati et al., 2013), but several others find that crises reduce the probability
of reforms (e.g., Campos et al., 2010; Mian et al., 2014). As our theory shows, the effect
of crises on reforms cannot be properly understood without controlling for the importance
of competence (as approximated by the selection concern). Indeed, as Easterly and Drazen
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(2001) document, crises decrease the likelihood of reforms whenever political competence
matters.
1.1 Related Literature
Several papers study political settings with rationally ignorant voters. Previous works, how-
ever, generally consider settings with fixed alternatives and study how well dispersed infor-
mation is aggregated in large electorates (e.g., Martinelli, 2006; Oliveiros, 2013).4 To our
knowledge, only a handful of papers embed rationally ignorant voters in a political agency
setting. Hortala-Vallve et al. (2013) show that restriction on politicians’ scope of authority
meant to limit policy swings that are harmful for poor voters might be counterproductive
when voters face a high cost of attention. Svolik (2013) examines the probability that democ-
racy stabilizes when politicians are potentially corrupt and it is costly for voters to observe
politicians’ actions. Matejka and Tabellini (2015) introduce rational inattention in a proba-
bilistic voting model to study the relationship between ideology and information, as well as
the resulting electoral incentives for public good and targeted spending. Prato and Wolton
(2015a) study how rational ignorance tends to exacerbate or mitigate electoral imbalances
(defined as asymmetries in voters’ opinions of party labels and candidates). In a companion
paper (Prato and Wolton, 2015b), we focus on voter’s behavior and show that voter’s lack
of attention cannot be conflated with a lack of interest for politics.5 The present manuscript
complements this literature by analyzing how economic conditions affect policy outcomes via
politicians’ electoral incentives.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the importance of electoral campaigns
for a functioning democracy. Several papers study how interest groups tilt candidates’ plat-
forms in their favor in exchange for campaign contributions (e.g., Baron, 1994; Grossman
and Helpman, 1996; Prat, 2002; Coate, 2004; Ashworth, 2006). Aragone`s et al. (2014) con-
sider how politicians can use campaign messages to manipulate voters’ electoral decisions.
In contrast, campaigns in our theory serve as a signal of candidates’ competence, whose
4The notion of agents’ “rational inattention” (Sims, 1998; 2010) has also been used in the macroeconomic
literature to study issues such as nominal rigidities (Mac`kowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) or the home bias (Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009).
5A few papers also consider how voters’ behavioral biases affect elected officials’ allocation of resources
(e.g., Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2014) or polarization in public opinion (e.g., Levy and Razin, 2015).
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informativeness is endogenous to candidates’ behaviors.6 Further, by considering rationally
ignorant voters, we propose a new approach to electoral campaign building on Dewatripont
and Tirole (2005): Voters’ (receivers’) information is endogenous to their level of attention
and to candidates’ (sender’s) effort. Other models of electoral campaigns are unidirectional:
they either study candidates informing voters (e.g., Prat, 2002; Coate, 2004; Ashworth, 2006;
Dewan and Hortala-Vallve, 2013) or voters learning about candidates (e.g., Martinelli, 2006;
Svolik, 2013; Hortala-Vallve et al., 2013).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section, we describe the model.
In Section 3, we study conditions under which the democratic system performs best. In
Section 4, we characterize equilibrium outcomes when demand for reform is high. Section 5
applies our findings to the empirical literature on crises and reform. Section 6 discusses the
robustness of our results and Section 7 concludes. Proofs are collected in the Appendix. In
the Supplemental Appendix, we provide a few ancillary results.
2 Model
We analyze a one-period three-player electoral game where a representative voter elects one
of two candidates (1 and 2). Before the campaign candidate j ∈ {1, 2} privately observes his
type t ∈ {c, n}, where c denotes competent and n incompetent. It is common knowledge that
the probability candidate j is competent is Pr(t = c) = q. Candidate j can credibly commit
to a policy platform, either a status quo policy (rj = 0) or a reform policy (rj = 1), which
is costly to implement. The effect of competence is two-fold. First, the cost of carrying out
the reform policy is lower for a competent politician than an incompetent one. Second, the
voter benefits from the reform policy (compared to the status quo) only if it is enacted by a
competent politician.
While a candidate’s competence is unobservable to the voter, she can learn a candidate’s
platform choice during the campaign. The probability the voter learns a candidate’s platform,
however, depends on her level of attention to the campaign (x ∈ [0, 1]) and on the candidate’s
communication effort to reach her (yj ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {1, 2}, which cannot be directly observed).
For tractability reason, we assume that the probability that communication is successful—
6Westermark (2004) also considers a model where candidates can use campaign expenditures to signal
their fixed policy preferences to voters.
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i.e., the voter observes candidate j’s platform—is yjx (Figure 1). After the campaign, the
voter elects one of the two candidates, whom we denote by e ∈ {1, 2}.
Figure 1: Voter’s learning during the campaign
The voter’s utility function depends on the policy implemented by the elected politician
and her level of attention. When the elected politician implements the status quo policy,
the voter’s payoff does not depend on the politician’s competence, and is normalized to zero.
When the the elected politician implements the reform policy, the voter’s payoff depends on
the politician’s competence. Specifically, the voter enjoys a payoff gain of G > 0 (relative to
the status quo) if the politician is competent, and suffers a loss L = τG if the politician is
incompetent. The parameter G captures the voter’s benefit from a successful reform, or her
demand for reform. The parameter τ , instead, represents the damage from having a reform
carried out by an incompetent politician, and captures the voter’s selection concern.
Due to cognitive constraints (or the opportunity cost of listening to political messages),
paying attention to politics is costly for the voter, as captured by the function Cv(·). The
voter’s utility function is then:
uv(re, x) =
 reG− Cv(x) if e is competent−reτG− Cv(x) otherwise (1)
Candidates are office-motivated. We normalize their payoff from being out of office to 0.
A politician’s payoff from being in office is equal to 1 when he chooses the status quo policy,
and 1 − kt when he implements the reform policy. The implementation cost kt, t ∈ {c, n}
captures the time, resources and political capital required to carry out a reformist agenda,
and satisfies: 0 < kc < kn < 1. Candidates also face a cost C(·) to reach the voter,
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which corresponds to the difficulty of defining and disseminating a clear message in a noisy
environment. The utility function of candidate j ∈ {1, 2} assumes the following form:
uj(rj, yj; t) =
 1− ktrj − C(yj) if elected−C(yj) otherwise (2)
To summarize, the timing of the game is:
1. Nature draws the type tj ∈ {c, n} of candidate j ∈ {1, 2}.
2. Candidate j ∈ {1, 2} privately observes his type and credibly commits to either the
status quo policy (rj = 0) or the reform policy (rj = 1).
3. The electoral campaign takes place. Candidate j ∈ {1, 2} exerts communication effort
yj. Simultaneously, the voter chooses her level of attention x. With probability yjx,
communication is successful: the voter learns candidate j’s platform (rj). Otherwise
the voter does not observe rj.
4. The voter elects one of the two candidates: e ∈ {1, 2}.
5. The elected candidate e implements re, the game ends, and payoffs are realized.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies (with
the caveat that the voter tosses a fair coin to decide which candidate to elect when indifferent),
and excluding weakly-dominated strategies. A formal definition of PBE in our setting can
be found in Appendix A (see Definition 1). When more than one such PBE exist, we select
the equilibrium based on the voter’s expected payoff (a common criterion in the literature
on election). Hereafter, the term PBE refers to strategy profiles satisfying Definition 1 and
the term ‘equilibrium’ refers to the voter welfare-maximizing PBE.
2.1 Assumptions
We impose some restrictions on the voter and candidates’ payoffs.
Assumption 1. The functions Cv(·) and C(·) satisfy the following properties:
1. Cv(·) and C(·) are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly con-
vex on (0, 1];
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2. lim
x→0
C ′v(x) = lim
x→0
C ′(y) = 0, lim
x→1
C ′v(x) = lim
x→1
C ′(y) =∞
3. C ′′v (0) = 0
4. C ′′(·) and C ′′v (·) are weakly increasing
Properties 1 and 2 follow directly from Dewatripont and Tirole (2005). Property 3 is
novel and guarantees that competent candidates and the voter exert strictly positive com-
munication effort when candidates play a separating strategy profile (that is, a candidate
commits to the reform policy only when competent). We impose Property 4 in order to
guarantee the uniqueness of candidates’ equilibrium communication efforts and voter’s level
of attention in a separating equilibrium. It is meant to simplify the exposition and relaxing
this assumption would not affect our result (which would apply to the highest and lowest
equilibrium communication levels).
As argued by Rodrick (1996),voters are unwilling to simply act a rubber stamp of an
ambitious reformist agenda. We thus impose a restriction on the voter’s selection concern to
incorporate voter’s initial skepticism.
Assumption 2. The selection concern τ satisfies: q − (1− q)τ < 0.
Assumption 2 implies that absent updates from the electoral campaign, the voter prefers
the status quo policy to the reform policy due to her prior about candidate j’s ability and
the payoff loss caused by a botched reform (i.e., a reform implemented by an incompetent
politician).
2.2 Discussion
The main novelty of our framework is that the probability that the voter learns a candidate’s
platform depends critically on her level of attention to the campaign. As such, in our set-up,
the voter is “rationally ignorant” as defined by Downs (1957). Our approach to voter learning
is consistent with experimental and empirical works documenting that voters are cognitively
constrained (Body, 2014; Brocas et al., 2014) and learn incrementally (Neuman et al., 1992;
Zaller, 1992). Furthermore, our campaigning technology assumes complementarity between
the voter’s level of attention and candidates’ communication efforts: greater voter attention
increases the effectiveness of a candidate’s communication effort, and vice versa. While
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intuitive, this complementarity assumption is not essential to derive our results: as long as
voter attention is costly and can vary, candidates’ equilibrium platform choice would be a
function of her level of attention and (while the analysis would be more complicated) our
results would go through.
The voter’s key electoral concern regards the successful implementation of a major shift
in economic policy. The reform can be a change of economic paradigm, as in Latin America
in the 1980’s, a major overhaul on a specific issue such as health care (e.g., the Affordable
Care Act in 2010), labor laws (e.g., the reforms in New Zealand in the 1990’s) or welfare
benefits (such as Portugal’s recent spending cuts). The reform policy can be thought as
an experiment where success does not depend on the state of the world (as in Callander
2011a and 2011b), but on political competence. Competence in our set-up can be thought
as a politician’s ability to correctly set the pace and scope of the reform as well as as the
compensation of winners and losers, which significantly increase the probability that the
reform will be successful (Haggard and Webb, 1993). An incompetent politician does not
possess these skills and dramatically increases the risk of badly engineered reforms, which
impose a large cost on society, as the Latin America experience demonstrates (Dornbusch,
1988; Krueger, 1993).
The economic environment is captured by two parameters: the demand for reform G
and the selection concern τ . We relate G to the economic conditions, and τ to the type of
policy domain affected by the reform. Large G are associated with worse economic conditions,
where a politicians’ competence is more valuable. Large τ correspond to more complex policy
domains, where lack of competence in carrying out reform produces nefarious consequences.
As noted above, competence also affects the cost of implementing the reform policy. For
instance, competence is associated with a higher ability to overcome vetoes, a superior capac-
ity to staff, insulate, and control bureaucracies (for a discussion of the costs associated with
any policy change, see Hall and Deardoff, 2006). Additionally, the lower implementation cost
might also result from politicians’ concerns for their place in history books, which depends
on the success or failure of reforms.7
7Politician could also care about voter’s welfare. This complicates the analysis without affecting our main
results as long as the weight on the voter’s welfare is sufficiently small.
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3 Conditions for well-functioning democracy
We first establish some general properties of the voter’s and candidates’ strategies on the
equilibrium path. The voter elects the candidate who gives her the highest expected payoff
given her beliefs about the candidates’ competence. While successful electoral communica-
tion fully reveals a candidate’s behavior if elected, it is not necessarily a perfect signal of
competence. However, since a competent candidate faces a lower implementation cost, suc-
cessful communication is always “good news”; it raises the voter’s equilibrium posterior that
the candidate is competent and consequently, always increases his electoral chances.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, a candidate’s probability of winning the election is (weakly)
greater after successful communication.
However, candidates do not always try to communicate their platform to the voter. Since
the status quo policy is costless to implement, committing to r = 0 can be understood as
a default option for a politician. A candidate has no incentive to pay a cost to reveal that
he commits to his default option. Consequently, in equilibrium, unsuccessful communication
lowers the voter’s expectation that the candidate proposes reform. In turn, this implies that a
candidate committing to the reform policy must exert strictly positive communication effort.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, a candidate exerts strictly positive communication effort if
and only if he commits to the reform policy (r = 1).
Lemma 2 has two important implications. First, a candidate faces a double cost of
committing to the reform policy: (i) a communication cost—C(y)—, borne regardless of
the electoral outcome, and (ii) the implementation cost—kt—, borne only when elected.
Second, an ‘unresponsive’ strategy profile (candidates pool on the status quo and exert zero
communication effort, the voter does not pay any attention to the campaign, and the election
is decided by the flip of a coin) is always a PBE (see Lemma A.2 in the Appendix). However,
the voter would be better off in a PBE in which candidates commit to the reform policy only
when competent. Moreover, whenever the voter’s screening problem is severe enough, this
separating PBE is also the welfare-maximizing PBE for the voter.
Lemma 3. There exists k∗n : [0, 1]→ [kc, 1] such that, whenever kn < k∗n(kc), the equilibrium
is separating if and only if a separating assessment is a PBE.
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When the screening problem is mild (i.e., the difference between the two types’ imple-
mentation costs is large), the risk of electing an incompetent candidate proposing the reform
policy is low. Now notice that the electoral attractiveness of a candidate—especially, when he
commits to the reform policy only if competent—is high when his opponent proposes r = 1
even when incompetent. Consequently, an assessment with one candidate ‘pooling’ on reform
and his opponent playing a separating strategy profile8 might dominate the separating assess-
ment, as the voter can raise the probability of welfare-improving reform without increasing
too much the likelihood of a botched reform. The candidate playing a separating strategy
profile, however, faces the same type of incentive compatibility constraints as in a separating
assessment. Consequently, since such asymmetric assessment complicates significantly the
analysis, we assume without great loss of generality that kn < k
∗
n(kc) for the remainder of
this paper.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that a separating strategy profile is incentive compatible only if a
competent candidate’s electoral reward for committing to the reform policy is greater than
the combined communication and communication costs. The reverse must hold true for a
non-competent candidate.
As they play a critical role in the analysis, in a first step, we determine the the expected
payoff of a type t ∈ {c, n} candidate j ∈ {1, 2}—denoted Vj(rj, yj; t) as function of plat-
form (rj ∈ {0, 1}) and communication (yj ≥ 0) choices—in a separating assessment. When
candidate j commits to the reform policy, he wins the election with probability 1 when the
voter only learns his platform, probability 0 when the voter learns only his opponent −j’s
platform, and probability 1/2 in all other cases. The value of holding office is diminished by
the implementation cost kt. A candidate committing to the status quo policy does not exert
any communication effort (Lemma 2) so the voter never learns his platform. His winning
probability is 1/2 when the voter does not learn his opponent’s platform and 0 otherwise.
He enjoys the full payoff from office (1) when elected. We thus obtain (taking the voter’s
8That is, candidate j anticipates his opponent plays a pooling strategy, candidate k 6= j anticipates j
plays a separating strategy, and the voter anticipates both candidates’ strategy.
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attention x and a competent candidate −j’s communication effort as given):
Vj(1, yj; t) =
1 + xyj − qxy−j
2
(1− kt)− C(yj) (3)
Vj(0, 0; t) =
1− qxy−j
2
(4)
Solving the model backward, the next lemma characterizes candidates’ and the voter’s
optimal communication strategies when candidates play a separating strategy.
Lemma 4. In a separating assessment, candidates’ communication efforts and the voter’s
level of attention are unique, and satisfy:
(i) incompetent candidates exert no communication effort: ySj (n) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2};
(ii) competent candidates’ communication efforts and the voter’s level of attention are strictly
positive: yS1 (c) = y
S
2 (c) ≡ yS(c) > 0 and xS > 0, where yS(c) and xS solve
C ′(yS(c)) = (1− kc)x
S
2
(5)
C ′v(x
S) = q(1− q)GyS(c) (6)
A competent candidate and the voter equate the marginal cost of communication ef-
fort/attention to its marginal benefit. For a candidate, the marginal benefit of communica-
tion is proportional to the increased probability of being elected net of the implementation
cost (that is, (1− kc)xS2 ). For the voter, the marginal benefit of attention is proportional to
the reduced probability of an electoral mistake—electing an incompetent candidate j when
candidate −j is competent—scaled by the benefit from avoiding such a mistake (that is,
q(1 − q)GyS(c)). As the demand for reform G increases, so does the benefit of successful
communication and, as a consequence, voter attention to the campaign. Since effort and at-
tention are complementary, a competent candidate’s communication effort is also increasing
with G.
Lemma 5. In a separating assessment, the voter’s level of attention (xS) and competent
candidates’ communication efforts (yS(c)) increase with G.
Intuitively, an increase in the demand for reform G should always benefit the voter. First,
a greater G raises the voter’s payoff when candidates play a separating strategy profile.
Second, it increases the informativeness of the electoral process (voter’s level of attention
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and competent candidates’ efforts), and consequently reduces the risk of an electoral mistake.
This intuition, however, does not take into consideration the effect of an increase in G on
candidates’ incentives to commit to the reform policy.
When making his platform choice, a competent candidate j ∈ {1, 2} compares the differ-
ence in expected payoffs between proposing the status quo policy (Vj(0, 0; c)) and committing
to the reform policy (Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c)), that is:
Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c)− Vj(0, 0; c) =
ySj (c)x
S
2
(1− kc)− C(ySj (c))− kc
1− qyS−j(c)xS
2
This difference corresponds to the net electoral premium of committing to a reformist
agenda. By the Envelope Theorem and Lemma 5, it is increasing in G as the effect of
an increase in the demand for reform is twofold. First, it raises voter attention and the
probability of electoral success conditional on choosing the reform policy. Second, it also
decreases the value of choosing the status quo platform, as such choice is more likely to
result in an electoral defeat.
When G is low, a competent candidate’s incentive compatibility constraint is never sat-
isfied (i.e., Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c)− Vj(0, 0; c) < 0). The voter pays little attention to the campaign,
so the net electoral premium of a reformist agenda is low. A competent candidate then gets
a higher expected payoff from proposing the status quo policy than from committing to the
reform policy, and a separating assessment is not a PBE.9 For large G, the voter pays high
attention, and a competent candidate prefers to commit to the reform policy unless his imple-
mentation cost is very large, that is, unless kc is such that lim
G→∞
Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c)−Vj(0, 0; c) < 0.
For a separating PBE to exist, it is also necessary that an incompetent candidate prefers to
commit to the status quo policy. When a non-competent candidate deviates and proposes the
reform policy, he chooses communication effort yˆS(n), which solves C ′(yˆS(n)) = (1− kn)xS2 .
By the same intuition as for the competent candidate’s communication effort, yˆS(n) increases
with G. As a result, an incompetent candidate’s electoral premium of committing to r = 1 is
also increasing with the demand for reform. Therefore, unless the voters’ screening problem
is very mild (kn is very large so lim
G→∞
Vj(1, yˆ
S
j (n);n) − Vj(0, 0;n) < 0), when G is large, a
non-competent candidate prefers to commit to the reform policy, and a separating PBE fails
9In particular, notice that as G tends to 0 a competent candidate never commits to the reform policy since
it is costly to implement and the electoral reward is null since the voter pays no attention to the campaign.
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to exist.
Proposition 1. There exist kc ∈ (0, 1) and kn : (0, kc)→ (kc, 1) such that:
(i) When kc ≥ kc, a separating strategy profile is not a PBE for any parameter value;
(ii) When kc < kc and kn ≥ kn(kc), there exists a unique G > 0 such that the equilibrium is
separating if and only if G ≥ G;
(iii) When kc < kc and kn < kn(kc), there also exists a unique G > G such that the equilibrium
is separating if and only if G ∈ [G,G].
Proposition 1 highlights that an increase in the demand for reform can induce a change
in candidates’ platform choices. Since a separating assessment maximizes the voter’s welfare,
there exists of a non-monotonic relationship between the voter’s demand for reform and her
welfare (see Figure 2a). Indeed, when kc < kc and kn < kn(kc), the voter’s equilibrium
expected payoff has a discontinuous drop at G.
The above analysis implies that when reforms do not entail large implementation costs
(kc and kn are below the thresholds defined in Proposition 1), the equilibrium is separating
only when the demand for reform is intermediary. A separating strategy profile cannot be a
PBE when the demand for reform is low because the voter would pay too little attention to
the campaign. Somewhat more surprisingly, a separating strategy profile is not a PBE when
the demand for reform is high since the voter would pay too much attention to the campaign.
In what follows, we study the consequences of this last result.
4 Reform in times of high demand
In all this section, we assumeG > G so a separating assessment is not a PBE by Proposition 1.
Two types of equilibria are then possible: an unresponsive equilibrium—candidates always
propose the status quo policy—or an over-responsive equilibrium—at least one candidate
commits to the reform policy when incompetent. The next proposition characterizes under
which conditions the equilibrium is over-responsive (recall that ‘equilibrium’ refers to the
welfare-maximizing PBE).
Proposition 2. There exists τ : [kc, 1]→ (q/(1− q),∞) and τ : [kc, 1]→ (q/(1− q), τ ] such
that:
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(i) for all τ > τ(kn), the equilibrium is unresponsive for all G > G and the equilibrium
probability of reform is always strictly lower for G > G than for G ∈ [G,G].
(ii) for all τ < τ(kn) the equilibrium is over-responsive for all G > G and the equilibrium
probability of botched reform is strictly higher for G > G than for G ∈ [G,G].
By Lemma 1, successful communication is always good news for the voter. However,
because successful communication is only an imperfect signal of competence in an over-
responsive assessment, the winning probability of an incompetent candidate promising reform
is non null and so is the probability of botched reform.10 As a result, the voter sometimes
prefers no reform. Intuitively, when the selection concern τ is low (so a botched reform entails
a relatively small payoff loss), the equilibrium is over-responsive in times of high demand for
reform. Conversely, when the voter’s selection concern τ is large (so a botched reform entails
an important payoff loss) the equilibrium is unresponsive in times of high demand for reform.
Proposition 2 characterizes general properties of the equilibrium when the voter’s demand
for reform is large (G > G). It illustrates how the electorate faces either a significant drop in
the probability of reform (to 0) or a significant increase in the risk of botched reform (from
0). This heightened risk can result from either (i) a pooling PBE or (ii) an asymmetric PBE
in which candidate j ∈ {1, 2} pools on the reform policy (rj(t) = 1, t ∈ {c, n}) while his
opponent pools on the status quo policy (r−j(t) = 0, t ∈ {c, n}).11 In a pooling PBE, the
reform policy is always implemented, not so much in the asymmetric PBE.
In an asymmetric equilibrium in which (say) candidate 1 separates, the voter elects 1
only after successful communication. Despite being an informative signal of competence,
successful communication is also an imperfect signal, so the voter is skeptical about the value
of learning candidate 1’s platform and pays relatively little attention.
Owing to the voter’s skepticism, when the equilibrium is asymmetric, the probability that
the reformist candidate 1 is elected (and consequently the probability of reform) can be lower
than in the separating equilibrium despite the higher the demand for reform.12
Proposition 3 establishes two necessary conditions under which an increase in G (for G
10As we have seen above, commitment to the reform policy is incentive compatible only if it is electorally
rewarded.
11Recall that our restriction on kn and Lemma 3 imply that a semi-separating assessment in which one
candidate pools on reform and the other separates is not a PBE.
12Despite significant differences across settings, the intuition behind this result is similar to Dragu and
Polborn (2014).
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close to G) is associated with a decrease in the overall probability of reform and an increase
in the probability of botched reform.
The first condition is that the implementation costs for both types must be close, so that
learning a candidate’s platform is a very noisy signal of his competence. Hence, the voter
pays little attention to the campaign, and the electoral reward for committing to the reform
policy is low. This low electoral reward implies that a pooling assessment where all candidates
are reformist cannot be a PBE. Incompetent candidates (at least) prefer deviating to the
status quo policy: they win with relatively high probability (1/2 whenever communication is
unsuccessful, a likely event when voter attention is low) and do not pay the implementation
and communication costs. In contrast, an asymmetric strategy profile does not face the same
incentive compatibility problem. The reformist candidate is elected if and only if the voter
learns his platform (unsuccessful communication is “bad news”). As such, he never has an
incentive to deviate to the status quo policy.
Our second necessary condition is that the selection concern τ is intermediary so the
voter pays some—but not too much—attention to the campaign. A positive level of attention
guarantees the equilibrium is asymmetric, and a relatively low level of attention guarantees
that the overall probability of reform decreases discontinuously around G = G.
Proposition 3. There exists k̂n : (0, kc)→ (kc, 1) such that for all kn ≤ k̂n(kc), there exists
τR(kn) ≥ q/(1− q) and τ0(kn) > τR(kn) such that at G = G:
(i) For all τ ∈ (q/(1−q), τR(kn)] (possibly an empty interval), the overall probability of reform
and the probability of botched reform increase discontinuously with G;
(ii) For all τ ∈ (τR(kn), τ0(kn)], the overall probability of reform decreases and the probability
of botched reform increases discontinuously with G;
(iii) For all τ > τ0(kn), the overall probability of reform discontinuously decreases to 0 with
G.
The voter experiences a drop in the overall probability of reform and an increase in
the probability of botched reform only if the equilibrium is asymmetric. This equilibrium,
however, has the empirically plausible property that the election pits a “party of order or
stability” against “a party of progress or reform” (Stuart Mill, 1859, Ch. II). This result can
also be related to the empirically documented association between high demand for reform
and political polarization (Mian et al., 2014).
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To summarize our findings, Figure 2 illustrates how voter equilibrium welfare (2a) and the
probability of reform (2b) change with the demand for reform G in the case of intermediate
selection concern (Proposition 3.ii) When the equilibrium is separating, the voter’s (ex-ante)
welfare is maximized. When the demand for reform is aboveG, the equilibrium is asymmetric.
As an incompetent candidate wins the election with positive probability, the voter’s welfare
decreases substantially, but remains strictly positive, despite the lower probability of reform
and the positive probability of botched reform. The reason is that competent candidates are
significantly more likely to be elected.
(a) Voter’s expected welfare (b) Probability of reforms
Figure 2: Equilibrium probability of reforms and voter’s welfare
In Figure 2a, the dark line is the voter’s equilibrium welfare. In Figure 2b, the dark line is the probability
the reform policy is implemented; the red dashed line is the probability of botched reform. Parameter
values: q = 1/2, kc = 1/4, kn = 1/2, τ = 1.01, Cv(x) = (1/5)(1/(1 − x) + x + 2 log(1 − x) − 1), C(y) =
(1/10)(1/(1− x) + x+ 2 log(1− y)− 1).
5 Crises and (the lack of) reform
As an application of our theory, we consider reforms in time of crisis. While there is no
standard definition of crisis in electoral and policy-making models, we follow Drazen and
Grilli (1993), Laba´n and Sturzenegger (1994a and 1994b), Mondino et al. (1996), and Drazen
and Ilzetzki (2011) and assume that a crisis is captured by a large demand for reform G,
especially G > G. Inversely, a low G corresponds to a favorable economic time when reforms
are less needed.
While conventional wisdom holds that reforms are more likely in time of crises (Tommasi
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and Velasco, 1996), empirical evidence on the issue have been mixed. Several studies docu-
ment a negative effect of crisis on the likelihood of reforms (Williamson, 1994; Pop-Eleches,
2009; Campos et al., 2010; Castanheira et al., 2012; Pepinsky, 2012; Galasso, 2014; Mian
et al., 2014). Some papers, on the other, corroborate the conventional wisdom (Lora and
Olivera, 2004; Alesina et al., 2006; Prati et al., 2013). This paper provides a way to organize
these seemingly inconclusive empirical findings.
Our model suggests that the probability of reform in time of crisis depends critically on
the voter’s selection concern, τ . When it is high (τ greater than τ or τR(·)), a crisis impedes
rather than triggers reforms (compared to more favorable economic time, G ∈ [G,G]). As a
result of voters’ increased demand, either no candidate proposes reform (Proposition 2) or
the voter’s increased skepticism reduces the electoral chances of those who do (Proposition
3).13 When the voter’s selection concern is relatively low (τ lower than τ or τR(·)), a crisis
can be positively correlated with reform. As a high selection concern arguably approximates
the difficulty to define the right policies to solve a crisis (the importance of competence), our
results provide a theoretical foundation for Drazen and Easterly’s (2001) empirical findings
that a crisis does not favor reforms when there is no clear solution to it.14
Due to the over-responsiveness of the electoral process, our theory also predicts that re-
forms in time of crisis are always more likely to be unsuccessful compared to more normal
conditions. While we are not aware of any existing empirical assessments of this claim, it ac-
cords with several anecdotal pieces of evidence. For example, in Latin America in the 1980’s,
periods of high inflation and negative growth led to attempts to reform an inefficient economic
system (based on import-substitution industrialization) with stabilization and liberalization
packages. But some of these packages turned out to be badly designed, aggravating rather
than solving the economic crisis (Krueger, 1992 and 1993; Mondino et al., 1996; Sturznegger
and Tommasi, 1998). Some reformist attempts were also misguided, such as Alan Garcia’s
populist economic policies in Peru in 1985-1988 (e.g., his financial and banking reforms)
which caused an episode of hyperinflation (Dornbusch, 1988). Other examples include Al-
berto Cavallo’s corralito to fight inflation in 2001, or the more recent heterodox policies (as
13The few theoretical papers which study how the likelihood of reforms vary with economic conditions
suggest that crises should trigger reform (Drazen and Grilli, 1993; Laba´n and Sturznegger, 1994a and b;
Mondino et al., 1996).
14Drazen and Easterly (2001) measure reforms by the growth performance 5 years after the crisis. As such,
their dependent variable does not distinguish clearly between low probability of reform and high probability
of botched reform. Notice, however, that both are compatible with our theory by Proposition 3.ii.
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described in Cavallo, 2014) aimed at improving economic conditions in Argentina, which in
both cases seem to have instead triggered an inflationary crisis.
6 Robustness
The set-up analyzed in this paper in the simplest to convey the intuition for our main results:
the non-existence of a separating PBE for large (or low) demand for reform and the risk of
over-responsiveness in time of crisis. The model can be extended in several dimensions.
First, our results are robust to the voter receiving a signal of candidates’ competence as
long as this signal is sufficiently noisy. The reason is that the voter does not care about
competence per se, but wants to elect a competent candidate who commits to the reform
policy. Therefore, the voter always has some incentive to pay attention to the campaign to
learn about a candidate’s platform.15
By assuming a representative voter, we also abstract from informational asymmetries and
coordination problems among citizens. Introducing multiple voters complicates the analysis
substantially, but does not affect the message of the paper. Prato and Wolton (2015) extend
a version of the model presented in this paper to an arbitrarily large electorate, and show
that (a slightly modified version of) Proposition 1 still holds. Indeed, despite the presence
of free-riding in information acquisition, each voter always has an incentive to pay a small,
but positive level of attention to the campaign. When all voters’ efforts are aggregated, the
probability that at least one voter learns candidates’ platforms increases with the demand
for reform G and the number of voters. As a result, multiple voters can make the existence
of a separating PBE more difficult (i.e., G decreases with the size of the electorate).
7 Conclusion
This paper studies how economic conditions affect the likelihood and quality of economic
reform in an environment with rationally ignorant voters. The electorate can obtain beneficial
reforms and avoid botched reforms only when demand for reform is intermediary. In time of
high demand for reform (for instance, due to poor economic conditions) the risk of botched
15A similar reasoning explains why our results are also robust to the presence of a (sufficiently small)
probability that the voter observes the candidates’ platforms without exerting effort.
20
reform increases significantly. The effect of high demand on the overall probability of reform,
on the other hand, depends on the strength of the electorate’s selection concern. When it
is high (i.e., competence is very important), the probability of reform decreases as either no
candidate commits to a reformist agenda, or the electorate rationally exhibits high skepticism
towards those who do, and elects them with low probability. High demand for reform is
associated with a high probability of reform only when the selection concern is low. By
highlighting the role of voters’ selection concern, our results can help organize the mixed
empirical evidence on the relationship between crises and the likelihood of reform.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to a common-value environment among voters
(using a representative voter). This assumptions allows us to show that welfare-beneficial
reforms can be impeded when demand is high even if there is no uncertainty about the
distribution of costs and benefits or group blocking their adoption. A promising avenue for
future research, however, is to study the effect of distributional conflicts on the adoption of
economic reforms within our new theoretical framework.
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A Equilibrium definition and proofs
We first introduce some notation. Denote by σj(t) = (rj(t), yj(t)) ∈ {0, 1}×[0, 1] the strategy
(policy choice and communication effort) of a type t ∈ {c, n} candidate j ∈ {1, 2}. The
tuple of strategies is denoted by σj ≡ (σj(c), σj(n)). Denote by mj ∈ {∅, rj} the outcome
of electoral communication: if mj = ∅ (mj = rj), communication has been unsuccessful
(successful) and the voter observes (does not observe) candidate j’s platform. We also denote
by µ(mj, x) ≡ µj the voter’s posterior belief that candidate j is competent conditional on her
level of attention x and observing mj . Finally, denote voter’s electoral strategy (probability
of electing candidate 1): Pr(e = 1) = s1(m1,m2, x) ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 1. The players’ strategies form a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) if the fol-
lowing conditions are satisfied.
1) s1(m1,m2, x) =

1
1/2
0
⇔ Eµ(uv(r1, x)|m1, σ1) T Eµ(uv(r2, x)|m2, σ2);
2) yj(t, rj) = arg maxy∈[0,1] E(uj(rj, y; t)|x, s1, σ−j), j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n};
3) x = arg maxx∈[0,1] E(uv(re, x)|s1, σ1, σ2);
4) ∀j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n},
rj(t) =
 10 ⇔ E(uj(1, yj(t, 1); t)|x, s1, σ−j) R E(uj(0, yj(t, 0); t)|x, s1, σ−j);
When indifferent, we assume that candidates follow the strategy which maximizes the voter’s
welfare.
5) µ(mj, x) satisfies Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Condition 1) is equivalent to the requirement that, after observing mj and m−j, the voter
elects candidate j ∈ {1, 2} with probability 1 rather than his opponent (−j) if and only if
(∀mj, m−j, σj, and σ−j):
µjrj(c)G− (1− µj)rj(n)τG > µ−jr−j(c)G− (1− µ−j)r−j(n)τG (7)
Let Γ(σj(t), σ−j) = E
{
IA + IB2
∣∣ rj(t), yj(t);σ−j} be the probability that a type t ∈ {c, n}
candidate j is elected when he plays strategy σj(t) and his opponent plays σ−j, where A is the
28
event “equation (7) holds” and B is the event “both sides of (7) are equal.” The expectation
operator is over the probability of successful communication with candidate j ∈ {1, 2},
candidate −j and candidate −j’s type. Γ(σj(t), σ−j) is increasing with µ(rj(t), x)rj(c)G −
(1− µ(rj(t), x))rj(n)τG and µ(∅, x)rj(c)G− (1− µ(∅, x))rj(n)τG.
Lemma A.1. There is no equilibrium in which rj(c) = 0 and rj(n) = 1.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. First, suppose σj(n) = (1, yj(n)), with yj(n) > 0
and rj(c) = 0. When communication with the voter is successful, a n type candidate j is
elected with strictly positive probability if and only if (by (7)): −τG ≥ µ−jr−j(c)G − (1 −
µ−j)r−j(n)τG. When communication with the voter is not successful, a type n candidate j
is elected with strictly positive probability if and only if: −(1− µ(∅, x))τG ≥ µ−jr−j(c)G−
(1−µ−j)r−j(n)τG. Given the properties of the communication cost functions and yj(n) > 0,
we have µ(∅, x) ∈ (0, 1). Then it must be that: −(1− µ(∅, x))τG > −τG. Therefore, a type
n candidate’s probability of being elected is strictly greater when mj = ∅. Since a candidate
always values being in office (kn < 1) and communication is costly, σj(n) = (1, yj(n)) is
strictly dominated by σj(n) = (1, 0), a contradiction. Suppose a type n candidate j plays
σj(n) = (1, 0). Since the voter never observes his platform, his choice of rj(n) does not
affect his probability of being elected. Since the reform is costly (kn > 0), it must be that
σj(n) = (1, 0) is weakly dominated by (0, 0).
Proof of Lemma 1. Fix candidate −j’s strategy σ−j. Using Lemma A.1, we need to consider
only three cases: 1) rj(c) = 0, rj(n) = 0, 2) rj(c) = 1, rj(n) = 0, and 3) rj(c) = 1, rj(n) = 1.
In case 1), successful communication has no impact on the probability of being elected (the
voter’s payoff is independent of a candidate’s type). In case 2), using a similar reasoning
as in the proof of Lemma 2, a type n must exerts zero communication effort. Successful
communication thus reveals that a candidate is competent and implements the reform. By
(7), candidate j’s probability of winning the election is weakly higher after successful com-
munication. In case 3), at the communication stage, both types solve the same maximization
problem, modulo the implementation cost:
yj(t, 1) = arg max
y∈[0,1]
{Γ((1, y), σ−j)(1− kt)− C(y)}
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Suppose µ(1, x) < µ(∅, x). Then Γ((1, y), σ−j) is strictly decreasing in y, which implies
yj(c, 1) = yj(n, 1) (the objective function is strictly decreasing in y). But then µj(1, x) =
µ(∅, x), a contradiction. Hence it must be that Γ((1, y), σ−j) is weakly increasing in y.
Proof of Lemma 2. Necessity. We prove the counterpart: rj = 0 ⇒ yj = 0. On the equilib-
rium path, given rj(t), the maximization problem of a type t ∈ {c, n} candidate j ∈ {1, 2}
chooses yj(t) is: maxy≥0 Γ((rj(t), y), σ−j)(1−rj(t)kt)−C(y), j ∈ {1, 2} t ∈ {c, n} The solution
yj(t) affects Γ(.; .) only through the probability that the voter observes mj(t) = rj(t). Using
Lemma A.1, we just need to focus on two cases: 1) rj(c) = rj(n) = 0 and 2) rj(c) = 1 and
rj(n) = 0. In case 1), since the voter anticipates correctly candidates’ strategies in equilib-
rium, communication has no effect on a candidate’s electoral chances. Since communication
is costly, it must be that: yj(t) = 0. In case 2), µ(rj(n)) = 0 and, by (7), Γ((rj(n), y), σ−j)
must be strictly decreasing in y, which immediately implies yj(n) = 0.
Sufficiency. Suppose that a candidate chooses r = 1. Using a similar reasoning as in Lemma
A.1, ∀t ∈ {c, n} σ(t) = (1, 0) is weakly dominated by (0, 0). So on the equilibrium path,
r = 1⇒ y > 0.
Lemma A.2. For all parameter values, an unresponsive strategy profile in which both can-
didates (independently of their type) commit to the status quo policy without exerting com-
munication effort, and the voter does not pay attention to the campaign is a PBE.
Proof. Given x = 0, we have mj = ∅, ∀yj ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {1, 2}. Using (7), the voter’s
expected policy payoff from electing candidate j ∈ {1, 2} is 0. Consequently, candidate
j’s probability of winning the election does not depend on his or his opponent’s platform
choice: Γ(σj(t), σ−j) = 1/2, ∀σj(t), σ−j, t ∈ {c, n}, j ∈ {1, 2}. Using a similar reasoning
as in Lemma A.1, a type t ∈ {c, n} candidate j ∈ {1, 2} has no incentive to deviate from
σj(t) = (0, 0). Given σj(t) = (0, 0) and communication is costly, the voter has no incentive
to exert strictly positive communication effort. Hence, the proposed strategies constitute an
equilibrium for all parameter values, and the implied probability of winning the election is
1/2 for each candidate j ∈ {1, 2} of each type.
Lemma A.3. There exists kSSn : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfying kSSn (kc) > kc such that, when
kn ≤ kSSn (kc), rj(c) = 1 and rj(n) = 0 imply that, in any PBE, r−j(c) = 1 and r−j(n) = 0
for j ∈ {1, 2}.
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Proof. First, we prove by contradiction that rj(c) = 1 and rj(n) = 0 = r−j(c) = r−j(n)
cannot be a PBE strategy profile. If it is, then the voter elects candidate j ∈ {1, 2} after
successful and unsuccessful communication since her expected utility from doing so is strictly
positive (given lim
y→1
C ′(y) =∞, y < 1 and µ(∅, x) ∈ [0, 1]), whereas the expected utility from
electing candidate −j is 0. Since communication is costly and has no effect on electoral
outcome, a type c candidate j does not exert communication effort. By Lemma 2, he cannot
choose rj(c) = 1 on the equilibrium path. A contradiction.
We also know from Lemma A.1, that r−j(c) = 0, r−j(n) = 1 cannot be part of a PBE.
There remains to show that r−j(c) = r−j(n) = 1 is also not incentive compatible under the
assumption.
Consider a semi-separating assessment (SS) when (without loss of generality) 1 pools on the
reform policy (r1(c) = r1(n) = 1) and 2 separates (r2(c) = 1, r2(n) = 0). Denote α
SS
j (t) =
xSSj y
SS
j (t), j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n}, the communication efforts satisfy (see the Supplemental
Appendix for details):
C ′SSv )
G
=(1− q)[qySS1 (c)− (1− q)τySS1 (n)− q(1 + τ)(1− 2αSS2 (c))ySS1 (n)] (8)
C ′(ySS1 (t)) =(q(1− αSS2 (c)) + (1− q))xSS(1− kt) (9)
C ′(ySS2 (c)) =(qα
SS
1 (c) + (1− q)αSS1 (n))xSS(1− kc) (10)
We claim that, for the semi-separating assessment to be a PBE, it is necessary that the
voter elects candidate 1 when (and only when) she learns his platform and does not learn
candidate 2’s. Suppose not. Since successful communication with candidate 2 is a perfect
signal of competence, then it must be that candidate 1 is also elected when (i) communication
with both candidates is unsuccessful (m1 = m2 = ∅) or (ii) candidate 1 is not elected when
only communication with candidate 2 fails (m1 = 1, m2 = ∅). In the second case, candidate
1 is elected with probability zero, and thus has no incentive to commit to the reform policy.
In the first case, candidate 1 would be always elected unless communication with candidate 2
fails, and hence would have no incentive to exert positive communication effort. By Lemma
2, this contradicts r1(t) = 1 for both types. Hence, we must have µ1(∅) − (1 − µ1(∅))τ ≤
µ2(∅) ≤ µ1(1) − (1 − µ1(1))τ , which requires τ ≤ µ1(1)−µ2(∅)1−µ1(1) . Notice that (omitting the
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superscript SS for notational simplicity)
µ2(∅) =
[
1 +
1− q
q
1
1− α2(c)
]−1
, µ1(1) =
[
1 +
1− q
q
α1(n)
α1(c)
]−1
.
Substituting these values into the condition τ ≤ µ1(1)−µ1(∅)
1−µ1(1) and rearranging, we obtain the
following necessary condition for the existence of a semi-separating equilibrium:
1
1+ 1−q
q
α1(n)
α1(c)
− 1
1+ 1−q
q
1
1−α2(c)
1− 1
1+ 1−q
q
α1(n)
α1(c)
>
q
1− q ⇔
1
1− α2(c)
(
α1(c)
α1(n)
− 1
)
>
1
1− q
Since the LHS of the last inequality approaches zero as kn approaches kc (by inspection
of 9, α1(n) approaches α1(c) as kn approaches kc), there exists k̂n
SS
(kc, G, τ) > kc such
that the inequality above is violated for all kn ≤ k̂n
SS
(kc, G, τ). We then obtain k
SS
n =
min(G,τ)∈R2+{k̂n
SS
(kc, G, τ)}.
An assessment is called separating if and only if it features rj(c) = 1 and rj(n) = 0 ∀ ∈ 1, 2.
We use the superscript S to denote the candidates’ optimal communication efforts and the
voter’s optimal attention associated with this assessment.
Proof of Lemma 3. We set k∗(kc) = kSS(kc). Notice that, by lemma A.3, if candidate j ∈
{1, 2} plays a separating profile, the same must happen to the two types of candidate −j.
Hence, there are four possible types of equilibrium: (i) a separating assessment (S), where
both candidates commit to reform only when competent (rj(c) = 1 ∀ j ∈ {1, 2}, rj(n) =
0 ∀ j ∈ {1, 2}), (ii) a pooling assessment (P), where all candidates propose the reform
regardless of their type (rj(t) = 1 ∀ (j, t) ∈ {1, 2}× {c, n}), (iii) an asymmetric assessment
(A), where without loss of generality (wlog) candidate j commits to reform regardless of his
type and candidate −j commits to the status quo regardless of this type (rj(t) = 1 ∀ t ∈
{c, n}, r−j(t) = 0 ∀ t ∈ {c, n}), and (iv) the unresponsive equilibrium (Lemma A.2).
Let V Ev be the expected payoff to the voter associated with assessment E ∈ {A,N, P, S}, and
let αEt the implied probability of successful communication with a type t candidate.
16 From
Lemma 2, V Nv = 0. It can be shown that V
S
v = qG+ (1− q)qα
S
1 (c)+α
S
2 (c)
2
G− Cv(xS) (see the
proof of Lemma 4 for more details). Given Cv(0) = 0, it must be that V
S
v > qG > 0. In the
16It can be checked that the probability is symmetric when candidates play a symmetric strategy, see
Lemma 4 and the Supplemental Appendix for more details.
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Supplemental Appendix, we also show that
V Av = qGα
A
c − (1− q)τGαAn − Cv(xA) (11)
V Pv = qG− (1− q)τG+ q(1− q)(1 + τ)G(αPc − αPn )− Cv(xP ) (12)
First, notice that αAc < 1 implies V
S
v > V
A
v . To see why we must also have V
S
v > V
P
v , notice
that since αPc − αPn < 1, V Pv < qG− (1− q)2τG+ q(1− q)G < qG, where the last inequality
follows from the fact that (1− q)τ > q.
Lemma A.4. A separating assessment is a PBE only if µ(m1 = ∅, xS) = µ(m2 = ∅, xS)
where xS is the voter’s optimal attention.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose candidates play a separating strategy and
that without loss of generality µ(m1 = ∅, xS) > µ(m2 = ∅, xS). Since (by Lemma 2) ySj (n) =
0, j ∈ {1, 2}, the above inequality implies that the voter always elects candidate 1 when
communication with either candidates is unsuccessful, by (7). A type n candidate 2’s expected
utility is thus 0. If a type n candidate 2 mimics a competent type’s platform by choosing
strategy σˆ2(n) = (1, yˆ2(n)), where yˆ2(n) = arg maxy∈[0,1] {Γ((1, y), σs1)(1− kN)− C(y)}, his
expected utility is strictly positive (since C(0) = 0 and Γ((1, y), σs1) > 0 because µ(1, x
S) = 1),
a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. Equation 5 follows directly from the First Order Condition of the maxi-
mization problem maxy∈[0,1] Vj(1, y; c) j ∈ {1, 2}, with Vj(1, y; c) defined by (3).
The voter’s electoral strategy is in this assessment: s1(∅, ∅) = 1/2 (by Lemma A.4), s1(1, 1) =
1/2 (since µ(1, x) = 1 for both candidates), s1(1, ∅) = 1, and s1(∅, 1) = 0. The voter solves
the following maximization problem:
max
x∈[0,1]
{
q2G+ (1− q)q
(
y2xG+ (1− y2x)G
2
)
+ (1− q)qG
2
(1 + y1x)− Cv(x)
}
(13)
We thus have the following FOC:
C ′v(x
S) = q(1− q)G
2
(y1 + y2) = q(1− q)Gy1 (14)
Where the second equality comes from the fact that y1 = y2 by (5). It follows that y
S(c)
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and xS (j ∈ {1, 2}) are defined by the system (5)- (6). We now show that this system has a
unique strictly positive solution.
Let Y S(x) = (C ′)−1
(
1−kc
2
x
)
and h(x) = q(1 − q)Y S(x) − C ′v(x)/G. Since Cv(.) and C(.)
are thrice continuously differentiable, the function h(.) is twice continuously differentiable.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a strictly positive yS(c) and xS
is that the function h(x) has at least one strictly positive zero (since the voter’s welfare
is increasing in yS(c) by the Envelope Theorem, our criterion selects the largest zero of
h(x)). Given the properties of the communication cost functions, h(0) = 0 and h(1) < 0.
Therefore, to show that h(x) has a unique strictly positive zero, it is sufficient to show that (i)
h′(0) > 0 and (ii) h′(x) is decreasing. Differentiating h(·) using the definition of Y Sc (x) yields
h′(x) = q(1 − q) (1−kc)/2
C′′(Y Sc (x))
− C′′v (x)
G
. Using the convexity of C(·) and the fact that C ′′v (0) = 0,
we can write h′(0) ∝ 1−kc
2
> 0. Uniqueness follows from the fact that C ′′(·) and C ′′v (x) are
both weakly increasing. Notice that uniqueness and continuity of h(x) in kc and G imply
that xS and yS(c) are continuous in kc and G.
Proof of Lemma 5. From lemma 4, (yS(c), xS) is the unique solution of (5)-(6). Using the
properties of h(x), we must have h(x) < (resp. >) 0 ∀ x ∈ (xS, 1] (resp. ∀ x ∈ (0, xS]).
Hence, at xS, h(x) must cross the horizontal axis from above. Since, for given x, h(x) is
continuous and decreasing in 1/G, the lemma immediately follows.
Lemma A.5. In a separating assessment, the voter’s attention (xS) and competent candi-
dates’ communication efforts (yS(c)) decrease with the competent candidates’ implementation
cost (kc).
Proof. Notice that h(x) is continuous and decreasing in kc
(
dYc(x)
dkc
= −x
C′′(Yc(x) < 0
)
.
Using (3) and (4), the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) of a competent candidate
j ∈ {1, 2} is:
Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c) ≥ Vj(0, 0; c)
⇔1 + y
S
j (c)x
S − qyS−j(c)xS
2
(1− kc)− C(ySj (c)) ≥
1− q
2
+ q
1− yS−j(c)xS
2
(15)
Denote yˆj(n) an incompetent candidate j’s optimal communication effort when he commits
to the reform policy: yˆj(n) is defined by C
′(yˆj(n)) = 1−kn2 x
S. An incompetent candidate j’s
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(IC) is:
Vj(1, yˆ
S
j (n);n) ≤ Vj(0, 0;n)
⇔1 + yˆj(n)x
S − qyS−j(c)xS
2
(1− kn)− C(yˆj(n)) ≤ 1− q
2
+ q
1− yS−j(c)xS
2
(16)
Lemma A.6. When candidates play a separating strategy,
(i) An increase in G or a decrease in kc relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of a
competent candidate j ∈ {1, 2};
(ii) An increase in G or a decrease in kc or kn tightens the incentive compatibility constraint
of an incompetent candidate j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. For a competent candidate, the effect ofG follows from d(Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c)−Vj(0, 0; c))/dG >
0 since dxS/dG > 0 and dyS−j/dG > 0 (Lemma 5). A similar reasoning (using Lemma A.5)
implies the result for kc. The reasoning is reversed for an incompetent candidate (since the
inequality is reversed in his (IC)).
Proof of Proposition 1. We only prove necessity. The proof of sufficiency proceeds by the
usual argument (details available upon request).
Point (i). Denote kc, the unique solution to the equation limG→∞ Vj(1, ySj (c); c) = Vj(0, 0; c).
17
To see that kSc exists, notice that for kc = 0, Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c) > Vj(0, 0; c), while for kc = 1,
Vj(1, y
S
j (c); c) ≤ 0 < Vj(0, 0; c). Uniqueness follows from Lemma A.6. If kc ≥ kc, (15) is never
satisfied and a separating strategy profile cannot be an equilibrium.
Point (ii). We first prove existence of the unique threshold G ∈ (0, 1) such that (15) holds
if and only if G ≥ G. Note that xS = 0 when G = 0, which implies yS(c) = 0. Given kc > 0,
Vj(1, 0; c) < Vj(0, 0; c) so (15) does not hold at G = 0. Since kc < k
S
c , there exists a finite
G′ such that Vj(1, ySj (c); c) > Vj(0, 0; c) for all G ≥ G′. Uniqueness follows directly from A.6
(i.e., the difference Vj(1, y
∗
j (c); c)− Vj(0, 0; c) is strictly increasing with G).
Existence and uniqueness of kSn(kc) ∈ (0, 1) follows from a similar reasoning as point (i).18
The proof of kSn(kc) > kc ∀ kc < kc is by contradiction. Suppose not. Then by Lemma
17While limG→∞ xS = 1, the properties of the communication cost functions guarantee that Yc(1) < 1.
This implies that type c’s communication effort and expected payoff are well defined even for arbitrarily large
G.
18The only difference is that the upper bound on kn depends on kc— kn(kc)—since an incompetent can-
didate j’s incentive compatibility constraint depends on kc through the voter’s and a competent candidate
−j’s communication efforts, see (16)).
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A.6 and the definition of kSc , limkn→kc Vj(1, yˆj(n);n) − Vj(0, 0;n) < 0, which contradicts the
definition of kSn(kc). Define kn(kc) = min{kSn(kc), kSSn (kc)}.
For kn ≥ kn(kc), an incompetent candidate’s (IC) is always satisfied, whereas a competent
candidate’s (IC) is satisfied if and only if G ≥ G.
Point (iii). The proof of existence and uniqueness of G ∈ (0, 1) follows from a similar
reasoning as for G. As Vj(1, yj(c); c)−Vj(0, 0; c) is decreasing with kc and increasing with G,
it can easily be checked that G < G given kc < kn. Now, an incompetent candidate’s (IC)
is satisfied only if G ≥ G, whereas a competent candidate’s (IC) is satisfied if and only if
G ≥ G.
Lemma A.7. There exists τ̂A : [0, 1] × R+ → [q/(1 − q),∞) such that the asymmetric
assessment (rj(t) = 1, r−j(t) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n}) is a PBE if and only if τ ≤
τ̂A(kn, G).
Proof. Wlog suppose j = 1. In this asymmetric assessment (A), the voter elects candidate
1 only if she learns his platform m1 = 1. A type t ∈ {c, n} candidate 1’s (IC) is then:
xAyA1 (t)(1 − kt) − C(yA1 (t)) ≥ 0, where the subscript A denotes optimal attention and com-
munication effort (see the Supplemental Appendix for more details). Given C(0) = 0, it is
clear that a necessary condition is xA > 0. The communication efforts satisfy (see the Sup-
plemental Appendix for details): C
′
v(x
A)
G
= qyA1 (c)− (1−q)τyA1 (n) and C ′(yA1 (t)) = (1−kt)xA.
Define
hA(x; τ) := qY Ac (x)− τ(1− q)Y An (x)− C ′v(x)/G, (17)
where Y At (x) = (C
′)−1((1 − kt)x). A necessary condition for existence of the equilibrium
is thus that the equation hA(x; τ) = 0 has at least one interior zero. Notice that hA(·) is
supermodular in (x,−τ): ∂2hA
∂x∂−τ = (1−q)dYn(x)dx > 0, since dY
A
n (x)
dx
> 0 by the convexity of C(·).
Supermodularity implies that the extremas of the set {x ∈ [0, 1] : hA(x; τ) = 0} are weakly
decreasing in τ (the opposite would require the existence of a point where ∂hA(x; τ)/∂x
is decreasing in −τ). Therefore, if hA(x; q/(1 − q)) has a strictly positive zero, then the
necessary condition xA > 0 holds for some τ ≥ q/(1 − q). Since hA(0; q/(1 − q)) = 0, it
is sufficient for existence of a strictly positive zero to show that ∂hA(0; q/(1 − q))/∂x ≥ 0.
Simple substitution yields ∂hA(x; q/(1 − q)) = q(Y ′c (x) − Y ′n(x)) − C
′′
v (x)
Gq
. By assumption,
C ′′v (0) ≥ 0. If C ′′(0) > 0, then Y ′c (0) is bounded above and we obtain using the definition
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of Yt(x), h
′
A(0) ∝ kn − kc > 0. If, instead, C ′′(0) = 0, then continuity and differentiability
of Yc(x) and Yn(x), C
′′(x) > 0, ∀x > 0, and Yc(x) − Yn(x) > 0 ∀x > 0 together imply
lim
x→0
Y ′c (x)− Y ′n(x) > 0. Suppose not, then it must exist x′ > 0 such that Yc(x)− Yn(x) ≤ 0,
a contradiction.
Supermodularity and the definition of hA(x; τ) (Equation 17) guarantees that there exists
τ̂A(kn, G) such that for all τ > τ̂
A(kn, G), h
A(x; τ) < 0 for all x > 0 (to see existence, take
τ →∞, dependence on kn and G follows from the definition of hA(·)). Hence the asymmetric
equilibrium exists only if τ ≤ τ̂A(kn, G).
For sufficiency, the proof that candidate 1 and the voter’s strategies are best response on the
equilibrium path follows from the usual argument. On the equilibrium path, candidate 2 does
not exert communication effort (Lemma 2). We need, however, to define the voter’s belief
after observing candidate 2’s platform (out-of-equilibrium event). We impose µ2(1, x
A) = q.
This belief implies that the voter elects candidate 1 whenever m1 = m2 = 1. To see this,
notice that µ1(1, x
A) > q since µ1(1, x
A) − (1 − µ1(1, xA))τ > 0 as xA > 0. With this out-
of-equilibrium belief, candidate 2 has no incentive to deviate since his electoral chances are
unaffected by his platform choice (he is elected if and only if m1 = ∅) and the reform policy
is costly. Hence, we have that τ ≤ τ̂A(kn, G) is a sufficient condition for the asymmetric
equilibrium to exist.
Lemma A.8. There exists τPExist : [0, 1]×R+ → [q/(1−q),∞) such that a pooling assessment
(rj(t) = 1, j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n}) is a PBE only if τ ≥ τPExist(kn, G).
Proof. Under a pooling assessment (P), candidates’ communication efforts and the voter’s
attention satisfy (see the Supplemental Appendix for details): C
′
v(x
P )
G
= q(1−q)(1+τ)(yP (c)−
yP (n)) and C ′(yP (t)) = 1−kt
2
xP . The voter’s optimal level of attention, xP , solves hP (x) =
q(1− q)(1 + τ)(Y Pc (x)−Y Pn (x))− C
′
v(x)
G
(where Y Pt (x) = (C
′)−1((1− kt)x/2)). Denote xP the
highest solution to hP (x) = 0 (existence follows from a similar reasoning as in Lemma A.7).
It can be checked that xP is increasing in τ (similar reasoning as in Lemma A.7).
A pooling assessment is a PBE only when a non competent candidate’s (IC) is satisfied.
Recall αPt = x
PyP (t), t ∈ {c, n}, a non-competent candidate’s (IC) is given by (see the
Supplemental Appendix for details):
αPn (1− kn)
2
− C(yPn ) ≥ kn
1− qαPc − (1− q)αPn
2
(18)
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It can easily be checked that the left-hand side (right-hand side) of (18) is increasing (de-
creasing) with xP . Hence, if (18) does not hold for xP , it does not hold for any solution to
the communication subform. Using xP increasing with respect to τ , if (18) holds as τ →∞,
there exists τPExist(kn, G) ∈ [q/(1 − q),∞) such that a pooling equilibrium exists only if
τ ≥ τPExist(kn, G) (dependence on kn and G follows from the definition of xP and (18)).19 If
(18) does not hold as τ →∞, then denote (slightly abusing notation) τPExist(kn, G) =∞.
Lemma A.9. There exists τPWelf : [0, 1]→ [q/(1− q),∞) such a pooling assessment (rj(t) =
1, j ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {c, n}) yields positive expected utility to the voter only if τ < τPWelf (kn).
Proof. Inspection of Equation 18 reveals that a pooling assessment is a PBE only if αPn (1−
kn) > kn(1−qαPc −(1−q)αPn ). Rearranging, we obtain that the difference αPc −αPn is bounded
above by α
P
c −kn
1−qkn . Inspection of Equation 12 reveals that V
P
v ∝ q − (1− q)τ + q(1− q)(αPc −
αPn )(1 + τ)− Cv(x
P )
G
. As a consequence, a necessary condition for V Pv ≥ 0 is
q − (1− q)τ + q(1− q)α
P
c − kn
1− qkn (1 + τ) > 0.
Using αPc < 1, straightforward algebraic manipulation yields that a necessary condition is
(1− qkn)(q − τ(1− q)) + q(1− q)(1 + τ)(1− kn) ≥ 0. Define τPWelf (kn) := q1−q
(
1 + 1−kn
1−q
)
so
the claim holds for all τ ≥ τPWelf (kn).
Corollary A.1. When τ ≤ τPWelf (kn), a pooling assessment is not an equilibrium.
Proof. Using Lemmas 3 and A.9, a pooling assessment is welfare-dominated by the unre-
sponsive PBE. Giving our selection criterion, it cannot be an equilibrium.
Inspection of (11) reveals that the assessment (A), when it is a PBE, welfare-dominates the
unresponsive equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let τN(kn, G) := max{τPWelf (kn, G), τ̂A(kn, G)} > q/(1 − q) (the
inequality follows from the definition of τ̂A(kn, G)). Above τ
N(kn, G), the equilibrium is
unresponsive since the asymmetric assessment is not a PBE (Lemma A.7) and the pool-
ing assessment is welfare dominated by the unresponsive PBE (Lemma A.9). Define τ :=
max
G>G
τN(kn, G) (dropping dependence on kn for ease of exposition). The claims hold since
19We do not exclude the case when (18) holds for all τ (i.e., τPExist(kn, G) = q/(1− q).
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the equilibrium probability of reform drops to zero whenever G > G.
(ii) Define τ := min
G>G
τ̂A(kn, G) (again dropping dependence on kn for ease of exposition).
By definition of τ̂A(·), τ > q/(1 − q). By definition of τ , τ ≤ τ (both are equal when
τ̂A(kn, G) > τ
P
Welf (kn, G) for all G, a sufficient condition). The asymmetric PBE always
welfare-dominates the unresponsive PBE for τ ≤ τ and involves a strictly positive probabil-
ity of botched reform (unlike the separating PBE when it exists). Hence the claim holds.
Proof of Proposition 3. In all that follows, we assume that G = G (notice that G depends on
kn so as we vary kn we also implicitly vary G). As a first step, we show that there exists k̂n(kc)
such that whenever kn ≤ k̂n(kc), a pooling assessment is not a PBE when it welfare-dominates
the unresponsive equilibrium (i.e., τ ≤ τPWelf (kn, G) by Lemma A.9). By Lemma A.8, it is
sufficient to show that Equation 18 does not hold for the highest level of voter’s attention
xP . Using a similar reasoning as Lemma A.5, it can be checked that xP is strictly increasing
with kn and x
P → 0 as kn → kc (recall C ′v(xP ) = q(1− q)(1 + τ)(yP (c)− yP (n)), C ′(yP (t)) =
(1 − kt)/2xP so yP (n) → yP (c) as kn → kc, and τPWelf (kn, G) is finite).20 Consequently, as
kn approaches kc, Equation 18 never holds. By continuity, there exists k̂n
P
(kc) > kc such
that a pooling strategy is never incentive compatible for an incompetent candidate for all
kn < k̂n
P
(τ). Define k̂n(kc) = min{k̂Pn (kc), kSSn (kc)} to complete the first step of the proof.
We now prove the rest of the proposition so kc < kn < k̂n
P
(τ). Define the probability of
reform in an asymmetric assessment by ΠA(τ) := qαAc +(1−q)αAn . The corresponding quantity
associated with a separating assessment is ΠS := q+q(1−q)αS (by Lemma 4, the voter’s level
of attention and a competent candidate’s effort are independent of τ). Hence, a necessary
condition for the probability of reform to increase at G = G is αAc > q. Define x
A the
highest solution to hA(x; τ) = 0, with hA(·) defined by (17). By Lemma A.7, xA is decreasing
with τ and as τ → τ̂A(kn, G), xA → 0. Therefore, there exists τR ∈ [q/(1 − q), τ̂A(kn, G))
(if lim
τ→q/(1−q)
ΠA(τ) < ΠS, then denote τR = q/(1 − q)) such that the overall probability of
reform (weakly) increases at G = G if and only if τ ≤ τR. Define τ0 = τ̂A(kn, G), the
probability of botched reform increases discontinuously at G = G for all τ < τ0 (since the
equilibrium is asymmetric). For all τ > τ0, the equilibrium is unresponsive, which completes
the proof.21
20Notice that G → G as kn → kc which tends to further depress the voter’s level of attention reinforcing
the main effect described in the text.
21At τ = τ0, asymmetric assessment might be a PBE, but reformist candidate is never elected.
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